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█ Abstract The problem of intersubjectivity has undergone multifold discussions in the philosophical, 
neuroscientific and psychological fields. Currently, the predominant theories in this ongoing debate con-
tend that simulation or explicit reasoning must ground other-understanding. Yet this contention confines 
the subject to solipsistic self-projection without actual communication. I will provide an analysis suggest-
ing that the roots of the concept of “empathy” reveal not only a dualistic inner-outer distinction but also 
an emerging reference to the bodily dimension. I claim that, by examining the verifiable-in-experience 
ideas of expressivity and dynamical value-based perception, the limits of the Theory Theory (TT) and of 
the Simulation Theory (ST) are resolved by means of a direct perceptual encounter that implies a unitary 
and never-isolated subject. I aim at showing that perception-based empathy provides an adequate basis 
for considering social dimensions from intersubjectivity to shared agency, since it allows for both direct 
embodied communication in cooperation and for the autonomy of agents involved in a collective domain. 
KEYWORDS: Empathy; Expressivity; Embodiment; Perception; Collective Intentionality 
 
█ Riassunto Esperire l’altro. Come espressività e percezione fondata sul valore forniscono un approccio non 
solipsistico all’empatia – Il problema dell’intersoggettività è stato oggetto di diversi dibattiti in ambito filo-
sofico, neuroscientifico e psicologico. Le teorie oggi dominanti sostengono che debba essere la simulazio-
ne o il ragionamento esplicito il fondamento della comprensione dell’altro. Tuttavia, questa discussione 
confina il soggetto in una solipsistica proiezione di sé, priva di reale comunicazione. Proporrò un’analisi 
che suggerisce come le radici del concetto di “empatia” rivelino non solo una distinzione dualista tra in-
terno ed esterno, ma anche un riferimento emergente alla dimensione corporea. Sosterrò che, esaminando 
concetti verificabili nell’esperienza quali espressività e percezione dinamica fondata sul valore, i limiti del-
la Theory Theory (TT) e della Simulation Theory (ST) vengono dissolti dall’incontro percettivo diretto, 
che considera il soggetto come unitario e mai isolato. Intendo mostrare come l’empatia fondata sulla per-
cezione costituisca un’adeguata base per considerare dimensioni sociali differenti, dall’intersoggettività 
all’agentività condivisa, poiché riconosce in entrambe una comunicazione diretta incarnata, che rispetta la 
cooperazione, ma anche l’autonomia, degli agenti coinvolti in dominio collettivo. 
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█  Introduction 
 
WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR the con-
stitution of a subject? Is this “subject” a mon-
adological, non-contradictory and self-
centered entity? These simple questions are of 
central importance to contemporary debates, 
and demand a reconsideration of the embod-
ied dimension of every living being. Our first 
experiences when we are born unfold as the 
whole repertoire of our perceptions shifts 
dramatically: for the first time, we must use 
our lungs to breath and obtain oxygen; as we 
“slide” into the world we experience novel tac-
tile stimulation; once we are outside the womb 
we have our first direct intersubjective inter-
actions, and we begin a continuous learning or 
teaching-and-learning relationship with the 
environment and other living beings.  
As I will show, our bodily structure is the 
definitive source of all value-based percep-
tion and the root of all I-cans that shape our 
possibilities for interacting with the world; 
this bodily structure is not a static essence 
that binds us within a “physical” prison sepa-
rated from a “mental” dimension. On the 
contrary, it requires continuous change, ad-
aptation and learning through direct contact 
with people and situations. In a similar way, 
the social embodied relationships we have 
from our earliest days will influence our mo-
tor development, our personality and atti-
tudes towards the world. An infant is primar-
ily in contact with the image of the other, 
even before it can look at the image of its 
own body;1 moreover, social and affective re-
lationships teach it to move into a shared en-
vironment, that can support or damage its 
development.2 As I will argue, interaction 
through facial expressions, gestures and 
movements, i.e., embodied relations, consti-
tutes the fertile terrain in which one culti-
vates a never-crystalized subjectivity, driving 
towards a solution to the solipsistic bias that 
many theories of empathy fall prey to. 
Social contact involves a direct dimension 
that is largely ignored in the main explana-
tions of intersubjectivity offered by today’s 
philosophy of mind, which split an individu-
al’s embodied and mental dimensions; this 
conception, however, theoretically withdraws 
the subject into a private and inaccessible 
sphere, without any actual possibility for di-
rect interaction with any other person. The 
following short excursus on the origins of the 
concept of empathy will develop into a de-
tailed account of the reasons why one should 
criticize both Simulation Theory and Theory 
Theory as incorrect and self-confining. At the 
same time, I intend to provide an interactive 
account of the intersubjective relationship 
that is shaped by and, in turn, continuously 
shapes the embodied, unitary dimension of 
everyday human experience. 
 
█  A bias regarding the “who”: A revision of 
the concept of empathy 
 
The long-discussed concept of empathy, 
which has undergone and still arouses bitter 
debates, clearly has not yet achieved an un-
ambiguous definition. This problem with the 
meaning of empathy, inherited from both the 
Greek (empatheia) and the German (Einfüh-
lung), is a tacitly presupposed dualism. “Em-
patheia” literally implies to “feel inside” 
someone, that is to say, it refers to the possi-
bility of experiencing another’s emotions. A 
spatial connotation is therefore involved, as 
if we could transport ourselves literally “in-
side” this person, adopt her perspective and 
feel what she does.  
A careful look at Plato’s Ion reveals that a 
specific concept of empathy was used to de-
fine the identification of the audience with 
the rhapsode, a feeling that the rhapsode 
himself could recognize in his audience by 
looking at their emotional reactions: if they 
reacted by crying, being appalled and exhib-
ited astonished expressions, it meant that he 
was correctly guiding them into the world of 
the declaimed epic poem (which he himself 
had to feel part of, displaying the appropriate 
emotional responses). Aristotle’s Poetics sug-
gests the public “suffers with” a tragic hero in 
a theatrical piece; the drama leads the audi-
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ence to a detachment from passions through 
a process of katharsis.  
Like the Greek one, the German term con-
tains the concept of “feeling inside” (Ein-
fühlen), but it derives from a Romantic notion 
of universal attunement with nature and 
mankind. In fact, this term made its first ap-
pearance in one of Johann Gottfried Herder’s 
works as hinein fühlen, an expression which 
means that we can feel ourselves only in the 
others.3 Einfühlung was the term then coined 
by Robert Vischer, the philosopher of aesthet-
ics, who claimed that we can feel a universal 
sympathy for mankind through empathy with 
another human being.4  
Both the Greek and German terms for 
empathy presuppose a “movement”, if it can 
be so defined, inside a person, that is to say, 
they assume an uncommunicative distinction 
between inside and outside, in which only the 
inside is the real location of feelings, emo-
tions, thoughts, intentions. It is not a sur-
prise, therefore, that theorizers of this kind 
of “movement” either overlook the embodied 
level or consider it to be a source for a pro-
cess of simulation through which the other’s 
intentions, feelings, etc. can be understood. 
Both conceptions present a common dualis-
tic bias in considering the individual to be 
split between, for instance, body and mind, 
mind and brain, reason and emotion, move-
ment and meaning, or external appearance 
and internal states. A significant example of 
the first type of perspective, which underes-
timates the embodied dimension, can be 
found in Descartes’ Second Meditation on 
First Philosophy. In his view, not only is the 
human being considered to be a sum of body 
and mind, but also intersubjective encounters 
with people in the lived world are considered 
to be abstractions from a process that splits 
appearance and reasoning: 
 
If I look out the window and see men 
crossing the square, as I just happen to 
have done, I normally say that I see the 
men themselves […] Yet, do I see more 
than hats and coats which would conceal 
automatons? I judge that they are men.5  
 
A dualistic conception certainly emerges, 
at some of the various levels described 
(mind/body, appearance/internal states, 
movement/meaning). Human actions in this 
perspective are meaningful only through rea-
soning: appearance cannot be trusted and only 
judgment can provide a correct comprehen-
sion of a situation, which means that we can-
not be directly acquainted with our fellow 
men but must instead infer they are fellows.  
The second case refers to the use of our 
own body as a source of simulation. It was 
supported by Theodor Lipps who, in his 
works about empathy, argued that it is a spon-
taneous and instinctive process.6 He thought 
that if we saw an acrobat walking on a rope, 
we would immediately feel an inner imitation 
of his movements. We begin to see here the 
first clues for an approach to empathy as a re-
lationship between two embodied subjects, 
even though the other’s intentions, according 
to Lipps, can only be accessed in a mediated 
way. In other words, Lipps’ perspective func-
tions as an intermediary position in the transi-
tion from dualism to non-dualism. 
The above-mentioned biases in interpret-
ing the intersubjective relationship find clear 
manifestations in the two theories that are 
currently predominant in cognitive sciences, 
Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory 
(ST). The first can be considered to be de-
rived from a certain Cartesian dualism. As 
regards Descartes’ quoted example, the TT 
claims that empathic ability consists in con-
scious and inferential judgments about an-
other’s mental states. A well-known reference 
is the Maxi Test, created by Wimmer and 
Perner,7 in which children are supposed to 
make a correct inference about a puppet’s 
mental states, by putting themselves “in its 
shoes”. More specifically, the puppet sees the 
child’s mother hiding some chocolate in a lo-
cation, but the chocolate is moved to a dif-
ferent location when the doll leaves the stage. 
In order to solve the test successfully, the 
child should correctly infer that the puppet 
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will look for the chocolate in the first loca-
tion it observed and not in the new location. 
This test therefore aims to measure the child’s 
ability to detect a false belief, using a «repre-
sentation as a frame of reference for interpret-
ing or anticipating the other person’s ac-
tions».8 This ability usually arises between 
four and six years of age, and ignores any em-
bodied interaction prior to that age as signifi-
cant for the understanding of the other. 
The second main category of empathic 
accounts, Simulation Theory, is rooted in the 
argument from analogy, because of the refer-
ence to one’s own feelings in order to under-
stand the other. It is of course a schematiza-
tion, since there are various different view-
points inside this definition. Among the ma-
jor theorists, it is important to mention the 
explicit simulation theory of Alvin Goldman. 
He supports «a blend of ST and TT, with 
emphasis on simulation»,9 and his explana-
tion of empathy can be summed up in three 
main points. First, the empathizer creates in 
herself pretend states. Second, she uses imag-
ination to develop them. Third, the process is 
built up in order to assign and attribute the 
pretend states to the other person, so that 
Goldman’s theory represents a simulation 
theory grounded in conscious inferences. Yet 
the problem of incommunicability leads to 
apparent solipsistic problems: how could one 
be sure that the simulated emotions corre-
spond to the ones experienced by the other 
subject, if she can only “imagine” them? How 
would the empathizer exit from her own 
monad, if the other is encountered and inter-
preted by self-projection? Does our experi-
ence work on explicit inferences, when deal-
ing with embodied social contacts? 
One of the major supporters of an implicit 
version of ST is the Italian neuroscientist Vit-
torio Gallese. His interpretation of “mirror” 
neurons, discovered when he was a member of 
Rizzolatti’s research team, maintains that the-
se neurons “fire” when someone sees an action 
because her motor system implicitly simulates 
the action as she observes it. Gallese’s “as if” 
system can be defined as subpersonal and rela-
tional: «Although we do not overtly repro-
duce the observed action, nevertheless our 
motor system becomes active as if we were ex-
ecuting that very same action that we are ob-
serving».10 This theory of empathy focuses 
therefore on an embodied subject. However, 
both the ST and the TT imply some phenom-
enological contradictions. 
I can better explain these impasses using 
an example taken from a common situation. 
You are sitting in the train when another per-
son enters your compartment and lifts her 
suitcase toward the baggage-designated 
space above the seats. Her hands start to 
shake, her back arches in an odd way, she 
wrinkles her eyebrows while her mouth as-
sumes a grimace. She repeatedly tries to lift 
the suticase and her movements become 
clumsier and clumsier, her facial features 
more and more contracted. Do you need an 
explicit inference to realize that she is having 
trouble lifting her suitcase up, or a simulation 
in which you project yourself into the same 
situation? Don’t you have an immediate 
grasp of her intention and her way of dealing 
with it? You surely do not need to stop and 
sum up her observable bodily elements plus 
the specific situation plus a theory on the 
mental states that she may be experiencing, 
nor do you have to project yourself into this 
other person in order to guess what she is go-
ing through.  
Let us focus now on the implicit version of 
Gallese’s ST, to pinpoint why his postulated ac-
count of the embodied dimension and the non-
neutrality of perception appears contradictory. 
Though he avoids a notion of inferential pre-
tense by restoring the role of bodies in intersub-
jectivity, I think that his view of neural simula-
tion poses a twofold problem. 
 
1) Gallese’s interpretation of the mirror-
system means that for him «action obser-
vation implies action simulation»,11 thus 
giving phenomenological importance to a 
neural structure, in other words, to a 
structure that cannot have any experi-
ence. His theory of embodied simulation 
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presupposes that action understanding is 
rooted in action simulating, since 
«[t]hese perceptual qualities are the in-
tentional correlates of the motor potenti-
alities expressed by our situated body».12 
Even though this claim seems to refer to a 
phenomenological dimension, reminis-
cent of Husserl’s notions of Paarung and 
bodily I-cans, the neuroscientist tacitly 
raises the mirror system to the rank of 
consciousness, since the firing of some 
cortical areas is seen as a direct pre-noetic 
experience of simulation. Yet, there is a 
clear difference between “neural” (sub-
personal) and “pre-noetic” (already phe-
nomenological, experienced). 
 
2) In the above mentioned quotation, 
Gallese refers to perception, highlighting 
its embodied correlation with our motor 
dynamical structure. I certainly agree with 
his claim that perception is non-neutral 
and rooted in the body, but his theory 
seems to give a simulation-in-perception 
account, that is, to imply either that oth-
er-perception could not be accomplished 
without a neural simulation, or that oth-
er-perception is ultimately this same neu-
ral simulation. Therefore, some questions 
might be raised concerning this second 
problem: how could one ever simulate 
something that she has not initially per-
ceived? And, admitting that simulation 
follows perception, why would one need 
to go back to her own bodily self to be 
able to interpret another’s action or feel-
ing, if the task has already been accom-
plished by a direct perceptual encounter? 
 
In so far as ST and TT presuppose a di-
rect acquaintance with one’s own self but a 
mediated contact with the other, they both 
derive from the argument from analogy, 
since a more or less tacit self-reference is im-
plied.13 In this sense, it would be possible only 
to guess what the other is experiencing: sub-
jects would be confined within a solipsistic 
sphere with no real contact with others, that 
is to say that our only ability to enter into 
contact with others, from this perspective, 
seems to be to project our own experiences 
into them. As Zahavi clearly asserts, 
 
will a process of simulation ever allow for 
a true understanding of the other or will it 
merely let me attain an understanding of 
myself in a different situation? As for the 
theory theory of mind, one could for in-
stance question some of its empirical 
claims and implications. If a theory of 
mind is required for the experience of 
minded beings, then any creature that 
lacks such a theory will also lack both self-
experience and experience of others.14 
 
After this focus on the philosophical roots 
of empathy, I will examine some intuitions of-
fered by phenomenology in order to reach a 
non-solipsistic view of the problem. Though 
the other would lose her otherness if we had 
complete access to her Erlebnis, a rediscovery 
of the concepts of expression and of values 
can provide a different view of intersubjective 
perception and therefore an exit from the “no-
windows” monadological sphere. 
 
█  Body-reading. A phenomenological view 
of empathy as interaction between em-
bodied subjects 
 
Going back to the origins of empathy, in 
Plato’s Ion the rhapsode declaiming in front 
of the public, already acknowledges the very 
direct importance of the public’s expression, 
which is perceived as having a specific mean-
ing for him. If the audience cries while listen-
ing, it means the rhapsode will laugh when 
receiving the money for his performance. But 
if he sees the audience laughing, it means he 
will cry about not being successful and there-
fore not getting paid.15 In order to shed new 
light on the intersubjective relationship from 
a phenomenological point of view, I think 
that the notion of expression may clarify why 
we can directly perceive the other. As I try to 
demonstrate, by acknowledging the role of 
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expression we can escape the solipsistic im-
passe of the argument from analogy and its 
ST and TT developments, and provide a way 
to consider empathy as a real embodied en-
counter with emotions, feelings, meaningful 
actions and so on, rather than as mind-
reading or a guess by projection. 
As becomes clear from its etymological 
roots, the German word Ausdruck (expres-
sion) means literally to “push out” (a feeling, 
an emotion, an intention). In such a phe-
nomenon, according to Max Scheler, the feel-
ing comes to be directly present in the expres-
sion or, in other words, the expression is part 
of the emotion itself. This implies that we do 
not perceive in a split-driven manner – first a 
physical body and then an emotion. On the 
contrary, the Körper (material body) is an ab-
straction of the Leib (lived body). For this 
reason, the subject is captured as an expres-
sive unity (Ausdruckseinheit), inherently em-
bodied, and the first step in social contact 
appears to be immediate and tangible. As the 
philosopher wrote, 
 
For we certainly believe ourselves to be 
directly acquainted with another person’s 
joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and 
pain in his tears […] If anyone tells me 
that this is not “perception” (Fremd-
Wahrnehmung) […] I would beg him to 
turn aside from such questionable theo-
ries and address himself to the phenome-
nological facts.16 
 
Rather than a simulation or a theory, the 
very basis of empathy involves a peculiar kind 
of perception, focused on movements and ex-
pressions in which the meaning is neither hid-
den nor added in retrospect. As Dan Zahavi 
pointed out, a phenomenological approach to 
intersubjectivity should describe the direct en-
counter with the other, and by so doing go 
towards an elimination of the illusory problem 
of other minds.17 Zahavi proposed in this arti-
cle that we go beyond empathy and criticized 
the empathic model, conceived as a thematic 
encounter between subjects, but more recently 
he has used this same term to refer to inter-
subjective contact. He characterizes empathy 
as a directly experienceable social dimension 
and he inserts it in a Phenomenological Pro-
posal that reconsiders the importance of em-
bodied interaction and mutual influence be-
tween non-static subjects. In the form of a 
“Phenomenological Proposal” or “Direct Per-
ception”, a third alternative to TT and ST is 
starting to converge with the expressive, per-
ceptive dimension described by Scheler.18 
To claim that empathy is grounded on a 
peculiar form of perception does not imply 
that the other is entirely transparent, or that 
I can have a first-person experience of her 
feelings.19 Since the subject has a private di-
mension, her otherness is preserved, but an 
interactive account based on direct percep-
tion explains how real communication is pos-
sible starting from the basic level. The prob-
lem of other minds, a phrase that suggests the 
invisibility of hidden mental states in an in-
ner dimension or in mere neural processes, 
reveals itself, instead, as a bodily-integrated 
matter. Considering the subject as an insepa-
rable unity of corporeal, kinetic and mental 
opens up the possibility for direct social ac-
quaintance, since the contact we can achieve 
does not take place with a mere physical ap-
pearance split from beliefs or emotions. 
The possibility of reaching the other 
through intersubjectivity without eliminating 
the other’s transcendence is particularly re-
markable in Husserl’s works. This is to say, 
although we are bodily interconnected with 
others, we cannot have a first-person per-
spective of their own experiences. In this 
sense, for Husserl empathy differs from origi-
nally given perception: if phenomenology is to 
explain the intersubjective problem without 
reducing the other to myself, then the consti-
tutive distance can be defined as appresenta-
tion, or analogical apperception. Which is, 
however, a matter of passive synthesis, a pair-
ing between two similar embodied subjects 
and not at all a form of analogical reasoning.20 
If ego and alter-ego are associated through 
an original pairing, as we read in Ideas II and 
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Cartesian Meditations, could it be said that 
Husserl refuses a theory of social perception 
completely? The father of phenomenology 
tends to give slightly different characteriza-
tions in his works, stating alternatively that 
there is or is not a possibility of perceiving 
the other.21 Although apperception and tran-
scendence would not allow for Husserl to 
speak of direct perception, in the same year 
(1913) Husserl and Scheler were both ac-
knowledging the role of expression, respec-
tively in Ideas II and in the first version of the 
Sympatiebuch. Consider the following state-
ments from Husserl’s Ideas II: 
 
expression appresents psychic existence in 
Corporeality, thus there is constituted 
with all that an objectivity which is pre-
cisely double and unitary: the man – 
without “introjection”.22  
 
Concerning the experience of others, eve-
ry person, in virtue of his Body, stands 
within a spatial nexus, among things, and 
to each Body for itself there pertains the 
person’s entire psychic life, grasped in 
empathy in a determinate way, so that 
therefore if the Body moves and occupies 
ever new places, the soul, too, as it were, 
co-moves. The soul is indeed ever one 
with the Body (sie ist ja mit dem Leib 
ständig eins).23  
 
If we compare this with the well-known 
paragraph on expressivity in Scheler’s The 
Nature of Sympathy24 quoted above, the same 
attention to the unity between psychic and 
physical dimensions means going beyond any 
Cartesian automaton. Clearly, the two men-
tioned phenomenologists claim a different 
level of unmittelbarkeit in social perception, 
though neither of them is attempting to re-
duce the other to the self. On the contrary, 
both theories give us a hint about how to re-
phrase our everyday experience. When we 
catch a movement from a human being, we 
automatically perceive it in a non-neutral 
way, with a pre-reflective focus on expressivi-
ty that does not allow us to split a movement 
or an expression from its meaning. The re-
searched “mental state”, at least as concerns 
the basic emotions and intentions, is present 
for Scheler in the expression. Phenomenolo-
gy demands a reconsideration of the empath-
ic process, based on a fundamentally non-
dualistic approach that cannot rely on simu-
lation or inferences. When we see someone 
walking, the fact that she has bent shoulders, 
a slow step, that her eyes and lips are turned 
slightly downwards, is immediately an index 
of her mood, without any need to sum up 
clues or make either an inference, or a simu-
lation in our own body. Moreover, how could 
we ever expect to simulate correctly some-
thing that we have not yet perceived? It is per-
fectly understandable, therefore, that Shaun 
Gallagher defines perception as smart, in-
formed and enactive.25 If we were asked to de-
fine what we see, our answer would be of the 
kind “a sad person walking”, and not, in a neu-
tral way, “a human being making slow walking 
movements, with bent shoulders and tense fa-
cial muscles that point toward the ground”. 
At the same time, the very construction of 
our sense of self is built through social con-
tacts and interactions. What Scheler defines 
in The Nature of Sympathy as an “undifferen-
tiated flux” (between mine and yours), im-
plements a continuous learning and redefini-
tion of our bodily-integrated system through 
repeated interactions, in which the parts in-
volved can create a shared terrain of action.26 
Value systems, meaning not only moral in-
stances but primarily basic patterns that cor-
relate with the release of brain neurotrans-
mitters and are guided (at least at a basic lev-
el) by evolution and evolutionary strategies, 
both influence and are influenced by new ex-
periences. This can be observed in the brain-
body integrated structure. 
As Gerald Edelman points out, value sys-
tems are responsible for the release of an ap-
propriate neurotransmitter that affects our 
perception, our reaction to and our interac-
tion with the world. On the other hand, syn-
aptic connections and perceptual categoriza-
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tion, related to value systems and to the sig-
nificance of situations and objects for the 
subject, are shaped and modified by new (so-
cial, perceptive,…) experiences.27 For in-
stance, we can learn things about the world 
through others’ observation: we can discover 
the danger of a specific action by seeing its 
effect on another person, instead of experi-
encing it directly ourselves. The way we per-
ceive that kind of situation from that mo-
ment on will be different, involving an expec-
tation of harm, a pre-noetic tendency to 
avoid it or escape from it, and so on. Value 
systems are unquestionably dynamic. They 
are not imposed in advance, but are both re-
sponsible for and affected by the very indi-
vidual history of the person, changing her 
neural structure and her possible interaction 
with the world. It is a reconfigurable dynam-
ics of action-reaction-interpretation that pre-
supposes an embodied subject capable of de-
tecting meaning and consequently capable of 
creative responses. This represents good evi-
dence for the phenomenological implausibil-
ity on which the distinction between inside 
and outside is based, since all the levels mu-
tually influence one another with no possibil-
ity of distinguishing discrete aspects. 
Would therefore our other-perception be 
the same without this value system? Most 
probably, without this very basic affective 
shape we would encounter a Cartesian au-
tomaton, a neutral machine equipped with 
movement on which we would project inten-
tions and meaning, a Theory Theory to the 
nth degree. Now, let us imagine we are primi-
tive people, hunting for a living and often 
changing settlement. With such inferential 
needs, we wouldn’t survive in the environ-
ment long! It would take us some time to de-
tect a predator’s movements, since they 
would have no direct meaning (in fact, we 
would need time to gather and sum up the 
clues in order to make a prediction). So we 
wouldn’t be able to recognize such move-
ments as “threatening”, or at least the process 
of collecting all the clues needed to interpret 
the situation would require so much time 
that we would meet a sure death in the pred-
ator’s jaws. On the contrary, with a value-
system and the ability to catch expressivity, 
an immediate and adequate reaction to the 
contingent situation would be possible, al-
lowing us in this case to hunt the animal or to 
run away as fast as possible. 
It is no surprise, then, that Edelman de-
fines values as based on evolution and, at the 
same time, the process of recategorization 
partially based on them as dynamic. A “stu-
pid animal”, with no capacity for direct 
meaningful perception and for learning from 
such perception would not survive in the en-
vironment. Even though it is not the aim of 
this paper to give an evolutionary account of 
empathy, I maintain that the perception of 
expressivity is very likely to emerge in re-
sponse to environmental stimuli, given the 
fact that surviving and being in good health 
can be regarded as values in themselves. We 
could think that, thanks to such values, and 
even before the birth of language, social rela-
tionships were made possible. Let us imagine 
the life of a primitive man: perception of 
movement and expressivity could have at 
least a double pivotal role. On the one hand, 
the detection of danger in the environment, 
such as the threatening movement of a pred-
ator or the sense of disgust provoked by tast-
ing or smelling a very bitter fruit, could teach 
us to elude poisoning and to learn what dan-
gers to avoid (the “expressivity” of the fruit, 
meant in the Gibsonian sense of affordance,28 
can therefore change from “inviting” to “dis-
gusting, to be avoided”). On the other hand, 
social relationships, which increase the pos-
sibility of survival, are made possible starting 
from the embodied pre-inferential layer. A 
good example, at the very primary level of 
the social dimension, is the birth of a child: it 
comes out of the womb crying, and it is im-
mediately perceived as a creature needing 
care, also thanks to its small dimensions and 
round, harmless eyes. Without the ability of 
immediately detecting expressions as mean-
ingful, probably a baby would simply be 
abandoned, since it is not able to formulate 
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and communicate a sentence about its needs. 
Again, in Gibsonian-expressive terms, its af-
fordance calls us to an act of care. 
My intention here is surely not to reduce 
the entire human dimension to an evolution-
ary or a merely biological basis. Rather, my 
purpose is to claim that the roots of the “self” 
and of empathy are clearly embedded in our 
body and in our active relationship with the 
world. Since every human being has a personal 
history which affects her values (just as values 
affect her perspective on this history), a prop-
er social account must consider not only the 
“universal grammar of expressivity”, but also 
the specific and the general contexts, the 
unique history and experiences of the person, 
and her never-neutral relationship with other 
human beings. The personal layer partially ex-
ceeds the perceptual experience and language 
certainly has a fundamental role in social con-
tacts, yet it would be surgically dualistic to ab-
stract an invisible “mind” from the “physical” 
person we encounter, just as it would be im-
possible to experience a feeling disconnected 
from our body. Even if we try to hide an ex-
pression, e.g., of amusement, our heartbeats 
still accelerate, our face muscles still relax and 
it is much harder to repress a guffaw than to 
manifest it. Bodily expression is, in this re-
spect, part of the emotion itself. 
Given that our perception is absolutely 
non-neutral, an actual dynamic relationship 
with the world and our human fellows takes 
place. It is of consequence to the arguments 
put forward in this paper to deduce that we 
never “receive” social stimuli (or any other 
stimulus from the environment) like a silver 
plate etched by a jeweller. I agree with what 
Shaun Gallagher and Somogy Varga claim: 
 
my perception of your action is already 
formed in terms of how I might respond 
to your action. I see your action, not as a 
fact that needs to be interpreted in terms 
of your mental states, but as a situated 
opportunity or affordance for my own ac-
tion in response. The intentions that I can 
see in your movements appear to me as 
logically or semantically continuous with 
my own, or discontinuous, in support or 
in opposition to my task, as encouraging 
or discouraging, as having potential for 
(further) interaction or as something I 
want to turn and walk away from.29 
 
Social relationships are therefore influ-
enced by contexts, affordances, meaningful 
movements and actions and, last but not 
least, by our disposition (from moods to 
emotions to the influence of past experienc-
es, for instance). The complex and “smart” 
character of perception remains however, at 
least for the basic processes of empathy, pre-
reflective, allowing for rapid, embodied in-
teractions with the world and our fellows. 
What I have argued does not aim to com-
pletely eliminate the explicit dimensions of 
the empathic process, as an act of verbal 
communication or of “putting ourselves in 
someone else’s shoes” might be considered, 
but rather to point to how the roots of social-
ity are deeply embodied in and connected to 
the world around us. What is indeed not suf-
ficiently noted in the main theories of empa-
thy, is this flesh-and-bones character of in-
tentions and emotions, which reveals a uni-
tary subject with no surgical split between its 
res cogitans (mental states) and res extensa 
(physical body). I reject a transparency theo-
ry that would claim perfect knowledge of a 
person, but it can be easily noticed in our 
own everyday experience that inferences or 
simulations are not needed to detect the 
meaningfulness of actions. A reconsideration 
of empathy in these terms intends to go be-
yond the mind-reading limits of both ST and 
TT, by stressing the fact that expressivity 
and value-based perception are reliable bases 
from which to reveal the fallacy of an inner-
outer distinction and to describe our pre-
noetical, direct encounter with the other. 
This non-solipsistic account comes to a 
close with a brief mention of the current debate 
about collective intentionality. Though the dis-
cussion is far too complex to be described in 
detail in the present article, a shared dimension 
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between two or more subjects could take inter-
subjectivity one step further. 
 
█  From interaction to shared action: what 
notion of “we”? 
 
In recent years, a differentiated and quite 
puzzling debate on the collective dimension 
has been carried on using terms like shared 
actions, inter-agency, collective intentionality, 
we-intentionality, joint attention, and so on.30 
It is not the aim of this article to list all the 
theories that concern the “we-dimension”, 
but I believe that a brief clarification is nec-
essary in order to establish what degree of 
kinship, in my view, these approaches might 
have with the notion of empathy I have been 
trying to outline. When switching from per-
ceptual interaction to collective intentionali-
ty, some perplexing questions might arise 
from the conceptual uncertainty about the 
nature of a possible “we”: does it imply a col-
lective entity that stands above individuals 
and, if this possibility is excluded, how is it 
possible to speak in terms of “collective” or 
“shared” rather than merely intersubjective? 
Is individuality preserved in these kind of 
phenomena, or is there a risk of falling back 
into the Schelerian concepts of emotional 
contagion and unipathy? 
When dealing with the notion of inter-
agency, given that agency can be defined as 
«the experience of being the source and the 
cause of our actions»,31 a phenomenological 
contradiction seems to arise. We move inside a 
milieu that, although shared among a plurality 
of subjects, is experienced from a first-person 
perspective. Like the Wittgensteinian meta-
phor of the eye in the visual field, which neces-
sarily entails a viewpoint that frames our vi-
sion,32 the first-person perspective represents 
the phenomenological residuum without which 
no experience would ever be possible. How 
would a sense of shared agency emerge, then, if 
the subject cannot exceed an originary first-
person frame? The scenario is obviously more 
complex. Albert Bandura points to a triadic re-
lation that influences a never-isolated human 
agency (personal factors, actions in a context 
and environmental constraints).33 From a dif-
ferent perspective, phenomenology can explain 
the same originary immersion in sociality by 
highlighting the basic connection between 
agency and intentionality. If intentionality is, in 
the Husserlian sense, the unavoidable being-
directed-towards-something of my conscious-
ness, this transcendental pro-perty describes 
every creature’s condition of being immersed in 
a lived world and in contact with other living 
beings from the very beginning. 
Since we share this milieu with others, it is 
no surprise that the first form of “we” can 
arise from joint attention, that is: “we are di-
rected towards the same object or event”, and 
I can clearly detect it from a person’s gaze 
turning towards a certain direction, an expres-
sion of interest or concentration, and so on. 
Gallagher speaks of joint attention as a capaci-
ty that emerges from the 9th month of life and 
lets us learn about the world through others;34 
what is crucial is his use of this phenomenon 
as a bridge between primary and secondary 
intersubjectivity. The author seems indeed to 
waver between ascribing joint attention either 
to a collective layer or to interaction between 
subjects. Both intersubjectivity and joint at-
tention cannot be conceived without primary 
interaction, yet it would be useful to give each 
of them its peculiar status: intersubjectivity 
would not be enough to justify the sense of 
shared agency or we-intentionality that emer-
ges in collective dimensions. Two people, 
when interacting, do not necessarily share a 
common purpose or attention to the same 
thing, as we can detect in the case of empathy 
itself (the empathizer is paying attention to 
the other’s emotional expressions, whereas the 
other is not necessarily focused on her own 
feelings). Still, Gallagher is right to aim at in-
vestigating how this first form of “we” is 
linked to empathic perception, as this could 
shed some light on the degree of agents’ inde-
pendence inside the collective dimension. 
It would be coherent with our previous 
reasoning, which led to a reevaluation of ex-
pressivity and embodied interplay, to con-
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ceive of a shared dimension in which interac-
tion is based on the possibility of empathic 
understanding through perception, with an 
experienced reciprocity that emerges from it 
but is not reducible to the mere sum of the 
subjects. Though the phenomenon cannot be 
reduced to separated intentionalities, I would 
differentiate a “sense of we”, which implies 
the feeling of accomplishing a common action 
and of being the cause of it together (shared 
agency) or of experiencing a common emo-
tion (collective intentionality), from the ac-
tual ontological supervenience of a collective 
entity. The phenomenology of subjects en-
gaged in a collective dimension cannot envi-
sion them as absorbed in a single mind (nor 
in an embodied entity, for obvious reasons), 
35 in which they would lose their personal 
sense of agency. To lose any sense of who is 
acting or is experiencing an emotion, while 
still feeling part of a “we”, would mean to fall 
prey to emotional contagion or unipathy. 
Scheler distinguishes between four forms 
of social acts: the immediate co-feeling of the 
same emotion “with someone” (das unmit-
telbare Mitfühlen “mit jemand”); the co-
feeling of “something” (das Mitgefühl “an 
etwas”), experienced with the intention of af-
fectively perceiving suffering or joy and ade-
quately responding (e.g. compassion for 
someone’s grief); emotional contagion (Ge-
fühlsansteckung), an involuntary process of 
identification where the I-thou perception is 
lost with respect to an affective state and the 
process itself poses purposes that go beyond 
single individuals (e.g. emotional outbursts 
that lead to the non-responsibility for actions 
in mass protests); unipathy (Einsfühlung), an 
extreme case of emotional contagion, in 
which not only is there a fusional confusion 
in the subject with respect to the experience 
of an emotion, but also the alter-ego is identi-
fied with one’s own ego.36 Scheler describes 
cases of emotional contagion and unipathy as 
normal (e.g. in erotic love) or as pathological 
(e.g. in schizophrenia) conditions, and as 
more or less transitory (e.g. hypnosis, chil-
dren’s identification in plays, some instinctu-
al components in the mother-infant relation-
ship). Some forms of unipathy are therefore 
quite ordinary or even necessary for devel-
opment, but an extreme case with absolute 
loss of individuality would be able to erase 
the personal dimension of a human being.37 
Since identification tends toward an “I”, 
where the experienced would be felt as a first 
person rather than as a collectivity,38 it is rea-
sonable to infer that in unipathic dimensions 
any “sense of we” is annulled. To have what 
we may call today a collective intentionality, 
the sense of agency of two or more subjects 
should be preserved. In this sense, Scheler uses 
the example of shared grief as experienced by 
two parents in front of their child’s corpse: 
their feelings are actually the same grief, the 
same sorrow. It is no more just a matter of 
empathic perception, since a further dimen-
sion of Mit-einanderfühlen emerges with reci-
procity and involvement as a “we” in a shared 
situation. No unipathic identification makes 
these subjects become an “I”, rather, while 
their feeling is identical, the function of such 
feeling is kept separated between mother and 
father. What is shared is intentionality, the be-
ing-directed towards the same emotion, but 
this neither collapses into identification nor 
fuses inside a single agent. 
Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo and 
Shaun Gallagher point out rightly that collec-
tive phenomena have their own autonomy, 
meaning that they constitute a self-sustaining 
system; nevertheless, this quality of a collec-
tive system also implies that «[i]nteractions 
are social as long as the autonomy of the 
agents is not dissolved» (since if dissolved it 
would become a form of coercion or, as I 
have argued, a unipathic fusion).39 This can 
be observed in the case of shared emotions, 
like the common grief discussed above, or 
collective actions. Searle uses the example of 
dancers in a ballet to explain collective ac-
tions,40 but it is not necessary to have precise 
choreography for that kind of we-dimension: 
direct perception and bodily interaction con-
tribute to the grounds for cooperation,41 even 
when dancers are meeting for the first time. 
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If one imagines, for instance, two salsa 
dancers, the situation could be described as 
follows: there is a more or less shared set of 
rules (basic steps, figures), a common field of 
embodied communication through interac-
tion (perception is shaped by practice, which 
leads to some holds and movements being 
experienced as intended to guide the partner 
in a certain manner or direction). To per-
form a good dance, the two dancers should 
not act merely to show their individual abil-
ity: a good performance is accomplished 
when there is cooperation, trust and success-
ful embodied understanding in interaction. 
Joint attention is directed towards rhythm, 
music and movements. I believe that this is a 
good example to show how the individual 
sense of agency is not lost (because a dancer 
always pays more or less explicit attention to 
her steps and gestures), but is rather inserted 
in a sense of inter-agency in which the two 
partners achieve a creative result that is not 
reducible to the sum of two single, detached 
performers. 
I maintain that an interactive and value-
based view of perception can lead to a better 
understanding of the social encounter, since it 
provides an adequate basis for conceiving of 
the collective dimension as grounded in em-
bodied experience and interaction. As one ap-
proaches TT and ST from an experiential 
point of view, the fact that they underestimate 
expressivity and interaction either because of 
the need for explicit reasoning or for self-
projection in simulation clearly appears to be 
phenomenologically implausible. How could 
we ever engage in a shared activity, if we had 
to guess each other’s intentions without the 
possibility of verifying them through direct 
understanding in perception? Would the two 
salsa dancers achieve a good shared perfor-
mance, if they always had to think explicitly 
about the meaning of their partner’s gestures? 
The idea of shared intentionality inside 
TT or ST would lead to inextricable im-
passes:  self-confined subjects, a mere sum of 
monadological dimensions could never prove 
the existence of an effective shared goal, nor 
would they be open to a collective, intercon-
nected dimension. On the contrary, by al-
ways keeping an embodied point of view 
from the very beginning of empathy, I have 
developed a perspective that frees the subject 
from the solipsistic barriers of the argument 
from analogy in all its derivations, and gives 
primary importance to the richness of the in-
teractions and learning processes that shape 
the human person.  
Nevertheless, even in a shared phenome-
non grounded on this basis, one’s individual 
agency and first-person perspective are not 
lost in one unifying mind that would absorb 
all subjects in a new “I”. As long as it avoids 
any form of unipathy, a current challenge for 
perception-based empathy is to find its prop-
er place in the debate on shared agency and 
collective intentionality. In my opinion, this 
could help us arrive at a well-grounded ex-
planation by providing an essential clue as to 
how the “we” emerges from “I-thou”, with 
the basis of a direct other-encounter as a 
starting point. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1 It is significant that for an infant, in Max Schel-
er’s example, intersubjectivity in the visual per-
ception of others precedes the recognition of its 
own feet: a newborn that sees his feet for the first 
time will have to learn the association between 
this optic image and his proprioception. See M. 
SCHELER, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die 
material Wertethik (1913/16), in: M. SCHELER, 
Max Schelers Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II, hrsg. von 
M. FRINGS, Bouvier-Verlag, Bonn 2009, p. 402. 
2 It has been demonstrated, for instance, that 
postnatal depression in mothers directly leads to 
impairment in their children’s capacity for emo-
tional regulation and cognitive development, due 
to a disturbance in the mothers’ attitude toward 
the infants (insensitivity, hostility or poor re-
sponse to the child’s attention). See L. MURRAY, P. 
COOPER, P. FEARON, Parenting Difficulties and 
Postnatal Depression: Implications for Primary 
Healthcare Assessment and Intervention, in: 
«Community Practitioner», vol. LXXXVII, n. 
11, 2014, pp. 34-38. It is important to remark that 
a theory of mind is supposed to be formed around 
 




the age of four/six (cf. the experiment by Wim-
mer and Perner below). Since the study by Mur-
ray et al. was carried out with children from six 
weeks to eighteen months, it suggests that inter-
actions have a role in the emotional and cognitive 
core of the formation of a person through embod-
ied and affective dynamics, without any need for 
inferential and explicit reasoning. 
3 J.G. HERDER, Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der 
menschlichen Seele: Bemerkungen und Träume 
(1778), in: J.G. HERDER, Sämtliche Werke, hrsg. 
von B. SUPHAN, Bd. VIII, Weidmannsche Buch-
handlung, Berlin 1892. 
4 R. VISCHER, Über das optische Formgefühl. Ein 
Beitrag zur Ästhetik (1872), in: R. VISCHER, Drei 
Schriften zum ästhetischen Formgefühl, Niemeyer, 
Halle 1927, pp. 1-44. 
5 R. DESCARTES, Meditationes de prima philoso-
phia, in qua Dei existentia et animæ immortalitas 
demonstratur (1641), in: R. DESCARTES, Œvres de 
Descartes, éd. par C. ADAM, P. TANNERY, Tome 
VII, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 2000 
(Eng. trans. Meditations on First Philosophy, in: R. 
DESCARTES, The Philosophical Writings of Des-
cartes, vol. II, translated by J. COTTINGHAM, R. 
STOOTHOFF, D. MURDOCH, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge 1984, pp. 3-63, here p. 21). 
6 T. LIPPS, Einfühlung und ästhetischer Genuß, in: 
«Die Zukunft», n. 54, 1906, pp. 100-114; T. 
LIPPS, Leitfaden der Psychologie, Engelmann, 
Leipzig 1909, pp. 222-241. 
7 H. WIMMER, J. PERNER, Beliefs About Beliefs: 
Representation and Constraining Function of 
Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding 
of Deception, in: «Cognition», vol. XIII, n. 1, 
1983, pp. 103-128. 
8 Ivi, p. 106. 
9 A. GOLDMAN, Simulating Minds. The Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading, Ox-
ford University Press, New York, 2006, p. 23. 
10 V. GALLESE, The “Shared Manifold” Hypothesis. 
From Mirror Neurons To Empathy, in: «Journal of 
Consciousness Studies», vol. VIII, n. 5-7, 2001, 
pp. 33-50, here p. 36. 
11 Ibidem. 
12 V. GALLESE, Finding the Body in the Brain, in: B. 
MCLAUGHLIN, H.K. KORNBLITH (eds.), Goldman 
and His Critics, Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken (NJ) 
2016, pp. 299-314, here p. 299. 
13 Zahavi’s criticism is relevant for ST, TT and the 
argument from analogy which are similarly com-
mitted to a view of the other having hidden men-
 
 
tal states, which in turn implies the need for me-
diation to interpret them. See D. ZAHAVI, Expres-
sion and Empathy, in: D. HUTTO, M. RATCLIFFE 
(eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Springer, Dor-
drecht 2007, pp. 25-40, here pp. 28-29. 
14 Ivi, p. 27. 
15 PLATO, Ion, 535e. 
16 M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie 
(1923), in: M. SCHELER, Max Schelers Gesammelte 
Werke, Bd. VII, hrsg. von M. FRINGS, Bouvier-
Verlag, Bonn 20057 (Eng. trans. The Nature of 
Sympathy, translated by P. HEACH, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London 1954, p. 260). 
17 See D. ZAHAVI, Beyond Empathy. Phenomeno-
logical Approaches to Intersubjectivity, in: «Jour-
nal of Consciousness Studies», vol. VIII, n. 5-7, 
2001, pp. 151-167. 
18 As regards Zahavi’s use of the term “empathy” 
and his Phenomenological Proposal, see D. ZA-
HAVI, Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A 
Phenomenological Proposal, in: «The Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology», vol. II. n. 3, 2011, 
pp. 541-558; D. ZAHAVI, Self and Other. Exploring 
Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 2014. For Gallagher’s theory of 
direct perception, implied in primary intersubjec-
tivity, see S. GALLAGHER, Direct Perception in the 
Intersubjective Context, in: «Consciousness and 
Cognition», vol. XVII, n. 2, 2008, pp. 535-543. A 
reference to Scheler can be found in both authors, 
see for instance S. GALLAGHER, D. ZAHAVI, The 
Phenomenological Mind, Routledge, London-New 
York, 2008, pp. 171-196. 
19 See also D. ZAHAVI, Expression and Empathy, 
cit., p. 32. 
20 E. HUSSERL, Cartesianische Meditationen und 
Pariser Vorträge, in: E. HUSSERL, Gesammelte 
Werke, Bd. I, hrsg. von B. STRASSER , Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1950, pp. 138-141. 
21 In addition to the well-known Ideas II and Carte-
sian Meditations, where Husserl stresses the im-
portance of appresentation, it is interesting to quo-
te two contrasting sentences from respectively the 
first and second part of Zur Phänomenologie der 
Intersubjektivität: «[a]nders für Leibeseigenschaf-
ten des fremden Leibes und für das zum fremden 
Leibe gehörige und mitaufgefasste Ästesiologische 
und Physische» (E. HUSSERL, Zur Phänomenologie 
der Intersubjektivität, Erster Teil (1905-1920), in: 
E. HUSSERL, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XIII, hrsg. von 
I. KERN, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, p. 47); 
«[e]s ist aber evident, das jedermann, der für mich 
 




„ein Anderer“ ist, als solcher für mich erfahrbar, 
keine andere Welt erfahren kann als eine solche, 
die auch für mich erfahrbar wäre» (E. HUSSERL, 
Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Zweiter 
Teil (1921-1928), in: E. HUSSERL, Gesammelte 
Werke, Bd. XIV, hrsg. von I. KERN, Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, p. 384). On the fluctua-
tions of Husserl’s conceptions of empathy, see D. 
ZAHAVI, Self and Other, cit., pp. 123-141. 
22 E. HUSSERL, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenolo-
gie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites 
Buch, Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur 
Konstitution, in: E. HUSSERL, Gesammelte Werke, 
Bd. IV, hrsg. von W. BIEMEL, Martinus Nijhoff, 
The Hague 1952, p. 167 (Eng. trans. Ideas Per-
taining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenom-
enological Philosophy, Second Book, Studies in the 
Phenomenology of Constitution, translated by R. 
ROJCEWICZ, A. SCHUWER, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1989, p. 175). 
23 Ibidem. 
24 See p. 10 in the present paper. 
25 See S. GALLAGHER, Direct Perception in the In-
tersubjective Context, cit. 
26 For a further analysis on the connection be-
tween intersubjectivity and shared agency, cf. the 
last section. 
27 See G.M. EDELMAN, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. 
On the Matter of the Mind, Basic Books, Harper 
Collins Publishers, New York 1992, p. 134. 
28 See J.J. GIBSON, The Ecological Approach to Vis-
ual Perception, Taylor and Francis Group, New 
York 1986. 
29 S. GALLAGHER, S. VARGA, Social Constraints on 
the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions, 
in: «Topoi», vol. XXXIII, n. 1, 2014, pp. 185-
199, here pp. 189-190. 
30 See for instance D.P. SCHWEIKARD, H.B. 
SCHMID, Collective Intentionality, in: E.N. ZAL-
TA (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Stanford 2013; A.S. ROTH, Shared Agency, in: E.N. 
ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, Stanford 2011. 
31 See D. CRIVELLI, M. BALCONI, Agency and Inter-
agency, Action and Joint Action: Theoretical and 
Neuropsychological Evidence, in: M. BALCONI 
(ed.), Neuropsychology of the Sense of Agency. From 
Consciousness to Action, Springer, Milan 2010, pp. 
107-122. 
32 See L. WITTGENSTEIN,  Logisch-philosophische Ab-
handlung (1921), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 
2003 (Eng. transl. Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 
 
 
translated by B. MCGUINNESS, D. PEARS, Routledge, 
London-New York 2001). 
33 See A. BANDURA, Social Foundations of Thought 
and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs (NJ) 1986. 
34 S. GALLAGHER, Joint Attention, Joint Action, and 
Participatory Sense Making, in: «Alter: Revue de 
Phénoménologie», vol. XVIII, pp. 111-124, here 
p. 116. 
35 In the context of shared emotions, Salice correctly 
points out that the idea of a group-subject would 
imply at least two impasses, from the ontological 
and the phenomenological points of view. From an 
ontological perspective, a disembodied mind would 
emerge and exceed individualities, whereas a unique 
entity of experience would mean that all individuals 
engaged in a shared dimension would have first-
person access to each other’s feelings, beliefs, 
thoughts. See A. SALICE, Shared Emotions - a Schel-
erian Approach, in: «Thaumàzein», n. 3, 2015. 
36 See M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sympa-
thie, cit. (Eng. trans., pp. 12-36). 
37 See ivi (Eng. trans. p. 35). 
38 Scheler claims that in emotional contagion the 
feeling would be perceived as one’s own, though 
the causal origin might be individuated in another 
person. M. SCHELER, Wesen und Formen der Sym-
pathie, cit. (Eng. trans, p. 37). This is apparently a 
form of transmission or identification that 
doesn’t correspond to the “sense of we” that I am 
trying to describe.  
39 H. DE JAEGHER, E. DI PAOLO, S. GALLAGHER, 
Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cogni-
tion?, in: «Trends in Cognitive Sciences», vol. 
XIV, n. 10, 2010, pp. 441-447, here p. 443. 
40 See J. SEARLE, Collective Intentions and Actions, 
in: P.R. COHEN, J. MORGAN, M. POLLACK (eds.), 
Intentions in Communication, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge (MA) 1990, pp. 401-415. 
41 On the notion of cooperation, Bratman criticizes 
Searle for being too strong in his claim that «[t]he 
notion of a we-intention, of collective intentionality, 
implies the notion of cooperation» (M.E. BRATMAN, 
Shared Cooperative Activity, in: «The Philosophical 
Review», vol. CI, n. 2, 1992, pp. 327-341, here p. 
406), though he refers to mutual support and cir-
cumstances cooperatively relevant to our J-ing. I 
think that Searle is right in holding a background 
sense of another as suitable for cooperation, but I 
claim that this is grounded in an intersubjective en-
counter in which nothing is more primary than my 
immediate perception of her as an embodied living 
 




being and experiential subject. I therefore agree with 





















































but I would define this experience as pre-noetic ra-
ther than primary. 
